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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
The choice of remedies made by the plaintiff operated even more harshly
to the plaintiff's disadvantage in Little v. Blue Goose Motor Coach Co. (11.
1931) 178 N. E. 496. The plaintiff recovered a judgment for five thousand
dollars for the death of her husband, the petition charging negligence on
the part of the defendant. The defendant had previously sued the deceased
in a justice of the peace court for damages to its bus and had recovered
judgment. The deceased appealed from the justice's decision but the ap-
peal was later dismissed for want of prosecution. The deceased's wife was
substituted as plaintiff in the circuit court case upon the death of her hus-
band. It was held that when the appeal was dismissed, and procedendo
issued, the justice's judgment became a final determination between the
parties and those in privity with them, and the circuit court judgment was
reversed. Since there was a trial on the issue of negligence in the justice
court, it seems that the apparent injustice is due entirely to the failure of
the deceased to prosecute the appeal and that the principle of the case is in
accord both with logic and established law. H. H. G., '33.
CHATTEL MORTgAGES-RECORDING--RIGHTS OF INNOCENT THIRD PARTIEs.
-To secure the purchase price on refrigerating units installed in two
apartment houses in St. Louis County, chattel mortgages were executed
and filed for record in the City of St. Louis. The defendant purchased the
property at a foreclosure sale under deeds of trust securing loans on the
realty. The owner of these deeds of trust had purchased them sometime
previous to the foreclosure without actual notice of the chattel mortgages.
The plaintiff brought an action in replevin to recover possession of the
refrigerators. Held, that by the installation of the units, they lost their
character as personalty and became fixtures, and that as between the vend-
or and a third party, an encumbrancer of the realty, the fling of the
chattel mortgage in the City of St. Louis was not notice, actual or con-
structive, of the plaintiff's rights so as to enable plaintiff to recover. Kel-
vinator St. Louis, Inc. v. Schader (Mo. App. 1931) 39 S. W. (2d) 385.
To determine whether personal property becomes a fixture three ele-
ments are usually considered by the courts: annexation, adaptation, and in-
tent. St. Louis Rad. Mfg. Co. v. Carroll (1897) 72 Mo. App. 315. The lat-
ter two are most important for the courts have shown a tendency to pay
more regard to the intent of the parties, as affected by the custom of the
locality, and the nature of the article, rather than to consider the facility
of displacement. In re Danville Hotel Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1930) 38 F. (2d) 10.
See (1919) 18 MIcH. L. Rav. 405. The mode of annexation, however, is
important in determining the rights of one who intends to purchase or en-
cumbrance the realty to which the article is attached, with regard to the
aspect of notice of prior rights of other persons in that fixture. In the
principal case, because the articles appeared by their physical attachment
to be a part of the realty, they were so construed.
The authorities are in unison to the effect that such a chattel mortgage
is binding on the original parties and on all subsequent purchasers or en-
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cumbrancers of the realty who have notice, actual or constructive, of the
chattel mortgage. They take subject to and are bound by the terms of the
mortgage. Ewell, FixTuREs (1905) 486; 26 C. J. 683 sec. 48; St. Paul
Trust Co. '. U. S. Cereal Co. (Minn. 1925) 206 N. W. 385. Prior encum-
brancers also may be subject to the chattel mortgage where the fixture is
severable, so that their security would not be diminished. Fred W. Wolf
Co. v. Hermann Savings Bank (1913) 168 Mo. App. 549, 153 S. W. 1094;
or that they are not encumbrancers without notice, Perfect Lighting v.
Grubor Realty Co. (1930) 228 App. Div. 141, 259 N. Y. S. 286. It is in the
answer to the issue whether the recording of the chattel mortgage is con-
structive notice to intending purchasers or encumbrancers of the realty
that the courts have reached conflicting results. The view that the re-
cording of the chattel mortgage is not constructive notice, with which the
instant case accords, is supported by the numerical weight of authority.
Jones, CHATTEL MORTGAGE (4th ed. 1894) sec. 134; Cunningham V. Cureton
(1895) 96 Ga. 489, 23 S. E. 420. The reasons advanced as bases for the
decisions are (a) that the principle of estoppel should apply against the
chattel mortgagee because it is his act which has made it possible for the
owner to deceive, Boeringer v. Perry (1917) 96 Wash. 57, 164 Pac. 773;
or, (b) that where the statutes require chattel mortgages to be separately
recorded and indexed, the intending purchaser or encumbrancer is not
bound to examine the records of chattel mortgages, Brennan v. Whittaker
(1864) 15 Ohio St. 446; or, (c) that to require such examination would
work a serious hardship upon such purchasers and encumbrancers and
practically nullify the recording statutes, Schmidt v. Carroll (Wis. 1930)
231 N. W. 181. On the other hand, the view that the recording of a chattel
mortgage is sufficient to charge intending purchasers or encumbrancers of
the realty with notice has received a strong minority support on the ground
that it is no more unjust that a third party should be required to take
notice of chattel mortgage records than to investigate and take notice of
tax liens or judgment liens. Eaves v. Estes (1872) 10 Kan. 314, 15 Am.
Rep. 345; Sword v. Low (1887) 122 Ill. 487; 113 N. E. 826; K ribbs v.
Alford (1890) 120 N. Y. 519, 24 N. E. 811; Ford v. Cobb (1859) 20 N. Y.
344. See also Liddell v. Cork (1922) 120 S. C. 481, 113 S. E. 321.
Since the principal case is one of first impression in Missouri, and the
decision accords with the majority view, further thought is presented as
to the means that should be adopted for the protection of a chattel mort-
gagee. Perhaps the best remedy so far devised is found in the Uniform
Chattel Mortgage Act, art. 5, sec. 45, which requires a statement of the
transaction signed by either mortgagor or mortgagee, briefly describing
the realty and stating that the goods are, or are not to be affixed thereto,
to be filed in the office where deeds of realty are recorded or registered,
and thus affect such realty and operate as notice to all persons dealing with
it. As a present practical means of improving his position, it is suggested
that the chattel mortgagee secure a deed duly executed and acknowledged
by the mortgagor, prior mortgagees, and other lien holders or persons hav-
ing any present interest in the realty, releasing for themselves, their heirs
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol17/iss2/13
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
and assigns, their interest in the fixtures. Since the mortgagor and mort-
gagee may, as between themselves, treat the property as either real or per-
sonal in its nature, there appears to be no serious objection to recording the
transaction as involving an interest in land, with a view to furnishing con-
structive notice to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of the premises.
Recording the chattel mortgage at the same time is justified as a protec-
tion and notice to possible vendees of the chattel mortgagor who might
wrongfully sever the fixtures and attempt to sell them.
It is interesting to note the Personal Property Laws of New York (Ca-
hill, 1923) c. 4, art. 4, secs. 65, 66, 67, and their classification of chattels
into three classes: first, chattels, which because of their character, remain
personal property after annexation to the real estate, even without an
agreement between the parties to that effect (and interpreted to include re-
frigerators or their units) ; second, chattels, which because of their char-
acter, inherently become a part of the realty (such as bricks, concrete piers,
etc.) ; and third, chattels, which, after annexation, continue to be personal
property or realty according to the agreement between the immediate par-
ties. See Chasnow v. Marlane Holding Co. (1930) 137 Misc. 332, 244 N. Y.
455. L. S., '33.
INSURANCE-INCONTESTABLE CLAUSE-RIGHT IN EQUITY TO CANCELLA-
TION FOR FRAUD AFTER INSURED'S DEATH WITHIN PERID.-After the death
of the insured, the insurance company brought a bill in equity against the
beneficiary to cancel the life insurance policy because of fraudulent misrep-
resentations made by the deceased. Held, such a suit is proper if the policy
contains a clause making it incontestable after a certain period from date
except for non-payment of premiums; but the bill must be filed within that
period and must allege that no suit at law had been instituted by the bene-
ficiary, so that the company had not been able to use this fraud as a defense
at law. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel (Mo. 1931) 42 S. W. (2d) 584. This
case is in accord with an earlier case before the St. Louis Court of Appeals,
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cobb (1926) 219 Mo. App. 609, 282 S. W. 494;
but the present case was certified to the Missouri Supreme Court because of
the alleged conflict between the latter case and the sweeping dicta against
suits in equity to cancel insurance policies after the death of the insured
which were contained in many earlier Missouri cases, based upon a statute
which seems mandatory in its demand that the issue whether the misrepre-
sentation was material or not should be left to the jury. R. S. Mo. (1929)
sec. 5732; Schuerman v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1901) 165 Mo. 641, 65
S. W. 723; State ex rel. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen et al.
(1926) 313 Mo. 384, 282 S. W. 46. The Supreme Court explained away this
conflict by showing that in none of the previous cases had there been an
incontestable clause and that if the insured could not bring such a suit in
equity, the beneficiary might deprive the former of a valid defense by de-
laying suit until the period of contestability had passed. Thus, the present
suit was likened to a bill quia timet, while the former attempts to sue in
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